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TDXRay: Microarchitectural Side-Channel Analysis of Intel TDX for Real-World Workloads

Confidential computing with VM-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) promises to protect code and data from a privileged cloud operator, enabling privacy-preserving workloads ranging from medical analytics to AI inference. However, most …

TREVEX: A Black-Box Detection Framework For Data-Flow Transient Execution Vulnerabilities

Transient execution attacks continue to pose serious security risks, even years after their initial discovery in the form of Meltdown and Spectre. Despite growing awareness and research, most attacks have been discovered manually. Existing automated …

StackWarp: Breaking AMD SEV-SNP Integrity via Deterministic Stack-Pointer Manipulation through the CPU’s Stack Engine

Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs), such as AMD SEV-SNP, aim to protect guest operating systems from an untrusted host by encrypting state and constraining privileged control. These platforms promise isolation even in multi-tenant cloud setups …

SNPeek: Side-Channel Analysis for Privacy Applications on Confidential VMs

Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs) enable new privacy-preserving solutions. Yet, they leave side-channel leakage outside their threat model, shifting the responsibility of mitigating such attacks to …

Automatic Discovery of User-exploitable Architectural Security Vulnerabilities in Closed-Source RISC-V CPUs

The open and extensible RISC-V instruction set architecture has enabled a wide range of new CPU vendors and implementations. However, most commercially available RISC-V CPUs are closed-source, making it challenging to analyze them for security …

Taming the Linux Memory Allocator for Rapid Prototyping

Microarchitectural attacks pose an increasing threat to system security. They enable attackers to extract sensitive information such as cryptographic keys, website usage patterns, or keystrokes. Softwarelevel defenses, such as constant-time …

ShadowLoad: Injecting State into Hardware Prefetchers

Hardware prefetchers are an optimization in modern CPUs for predicting memory accesses and preemptively loading the corresponding value into the cache. Previous work showed that the internal state of hardware prefetchers can act as a side channel, …

CacheWarp: Software-based Fault Injection using Selective State Reset

AMD SEV is a trusted-execution environment (TEE), providing confidentiality and integrity for virtual machines (VMs). With AMD SEV, it is possible to securely run VMs on an untrusted hypervisor. While previous attacks demonstrated architectural …

Indirect Meltdown: Building Novel Side-Channel Attacks from Transient Execution Attacks

The transient-execution attack Meltdown leaks sensitive information by transiently accessing inaccessible data during out-of-order execution. Although Meltdown is fixed in hardware for recent CPU generations, most currently-deployed CPUs have to rely …

Reviving Meltdown 3a

Since the initial discovery of Meltdown and Spectre in 2017, different variants of these attacks have been discovered. One often overlooked variant is Meltdown 3a, also known as Meltdown-CPL-REG. Even though Meltdown-CPL-REG was initially discovered …